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ABSTRACT
This uhesis offers an overview of Frencn r.auionaiisin,
racism and Atlanticism in the country's past, present and
fuLure. It argues that nationalism and racism lie at the
root of the French socio-political polemics and that the
contemporary problems draw from Frencn history. This
explanation places particular emphasis upon the evolution of
Trance as a cohesive nation-state and the subsequent
development and definition of the French citizen, as v;ell as
the corollary concept of the foreigner.
This study also discusses the repercussions of
nationalism as exhibited through xenophobic tendencies and
racism throughout French history and into the present. The
French integration model further explored, reveals
nationalist proclivities that intertwine with the
assimilation process of immigrants. This thesis seeks to
unknot the issues of French nationalism as a basis for
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The challenges facing France tDday mirrcr ihe croblems
of Zurope generally m the post -Cold V.'ar, in a word, me
poliiical dilemmas of integration and disinLegrarion. In
1995, ihe promise of a federal Europe pales against: me
re\^ival of nationalism, racism., ceparanism and
particularism. In France, ihese increasingly antagonisnic
nationalise passions have m.anifesued themselves 'lariousiy as
double-digio electoral '/icoories for right-'.ving extremisos,
resurgent miovem.ents for regional autonomy in Briotany and
international irade disputes over domesuic subsidies for
French farmers and filmmakers. The trend continues. ".-^Jhere
did these nationalist impulses originate in the French past?
And v;hat do they bode for the French future?
This thesis provides an overview of French nationalism,
racism and Atlanticism in the country's past, present and
future. It argues that nationalism and racism lie at the
root of the French socio-political polemics and that the
contemporary problems draw from French history. This
explanation places particular emphasis upon the evolution of
France as a cohesive nation-state and the subsequent:
development and definition of the French citizen, as well as
the corollary concept of the foreigner.
vi
This study also discusses the repercussions of
nationalism as exhibited through xenophobic tendencies ?.nd
racism throughout French history and into tne present. The
Frencn integration model further explored, reveals
nationalist proclivities that intertv/ine -.-.-ith tne
assimilation process of immigrants. In other v/ords , ine
current Frencn identity crisis concerns internal and
external integration, as well as the past, present and
future
.
U.S. policy-makers must comprehend the rational and non-
rational aspects of France's current nationalist problems in
their full historical context. The United States fails to
understand the nationalist dilemma in France today, even
though the paradoxes and tensions of nationalism, racism,
citizenship and immigration continue to make themselves felt
in American society. This thesis, then, seeks to unknot the
issues of _ French nationalism as a basis for better
understanding and more effective policy. The topic is all
the more timely in light of the fine-line relationship
between nationalism and war, which reverberates in political




This thesis explores the interrelationship of Frencn
nationalism, racism and Altanticism in zhe past, present and
future within a general exploration of '_'.£. security c-.nd so-
called "ethnic conflict" after 1989. It argues tnat
nationalism and racism underlies French society and otfers
an explanation of the revived French identity crisis after
1989. This explanation places particular smpnasis upon the
evolution of France as an integral naticn-state , as v;ell as
the eoncomitant development and definition of the French
citizen. And, by extension, the French conception of the
foreigner
.
In particular, this thesis discusses the effects of
French nationalism as xenophobia and racism in past and
present crises. Especially, this revived xenophobia poses
a worrisome threat to shared Atlantic values and stability
in Europe
.
The French mechanism of immigration ments further study
as it reveals nationalist proclivities as they intertv;ine
with the assimilation and integration process of immigrants.
Official French policy, in addition to social pressure, has
sought to preserve one conception of French national
identity, a community of cominon history, "raditicns, "aiues
and language. Today, r.owever, French social conesion '...is
now ihreaoened by ios failure oo integrate third v;orld
immigrants."- The idea of imimigrants as a threat has ceen
heiahtened by the spread of Islam and France's economic
crisis .
"
The French socialist government in the 1980s effected a
move toward more pluralism and m.ulticulturalism and oversaw
a shift in policy toward "diversity," the protection of
immigrant particularism. Although the Mitterand goverrjment
heralded diversity as a national example, the French body
politic clung to its nationalist self -conception that could
include foreigners who adopted the French "way of life."
Since 1989, nationalist impulses have reemerged in France
and have not diminished in strength.
The implications of France's identity crisis, arising
from the tensions of internal and external integration, are
of importance for the future of Europe since as a whole the
continent witnesses old and new ethnic groups seeking a
national, integral identity. The revival of genocide in the
-Alan Riding, "France, Reversing the Course, Fights
Immigrants' Refusal to Be French," The New York Times , 5 December
1993.
=Ibid.
Balkans suggests chat these conflicts can lead even in
Europe to the extremes of violence and v;ar . A nationalist
wave is spreading and at the time of this work, a clear
resolution has ^.'et to follow.
To be sure the French landscape is not torn as the
former Yugoslavia and racial unrest has not reached the
murderous magnitude of that in Germany still, latent
conflict is ever present v;ithin France's corders . in
official policy and popular opinion, anti-Semitism, anti-
immigrant sentiments, xenophoDia and racism persist v/itnin
France. As elsewhere on the Continent, these agitations
nave roots in the past.
The year 1993 was to trumpet the beginning of a united
Europe, free of frontiers. The categories of Frenchman,
German or Italian were to disappear with the polyglot
concept of federal "European." The Mitterand government
gave its full support to united Europe, yet a French
referendum on the Maastrict treaty on practical unity
received only a 51 percent popular approval. This
development evidences the infeasibility of a European Union
in the near future, and all because of nationalism. Despite
the much- touted strength-in-numbers of a federal Europe, the
French proved loathe to turn loose of France as the focus of
their allegiance.
since che 1960s, the increasing presence of Islam m
France has exacerbated racist and xenophobic tendencies.
islam is the second mosu v;idely practiced fainh in France
and ihanks ~o tne influx of Muslims, Arab immigranus from
France's erstwhile Northern African colonies. Everyday
scenes f life in France have come to include mosques,
prayer rooms, ihe faithful kneeling m the streets,
religious militant union leaaers m industrial dispunes-,
mixed marriages and the mixed-race children. The Frencn
maintain a historical memory of Arabian dominance m ine
seventh century that compounds their fear.
Security implications associated with France's identity
crisis have internal and external ramifications. First,
France is among several nations experiencing an immigration
dilemma. Europe as a whole is suffering the strains of
massive immigration currents from the former Soviet Union,
the East bloc and developing countries. The United States,
c. '.veil, has unresolved immigration concerns. Regarding
immigration, Jacob Burckhardt states:
It is against the emigres that the fury rages miost
fiercely. Those at home immensely overrate, or
pretend to overrate, their power. Anyone who has
eluded maltreatment and murder is branded as a
robber. When princes such as the Grand Duke Cosimo
'Catherine VJihtol de VJenden, "North African Immigration and
the French Political Imaginary, " in Maxim Silverman, ed. , Race,
Discourse and Power m France (Brookfield: Gower Publishing
Company, 1991) : 108.
and Francesco Medici pursued their distant emigres v^iLh
poison, the whole world was indignant, bun if republics
imprison or execute such relatives of emigres as r.ave
remained at home, it is regarded as a 'political
measure . "
"
-he irrench iminigraiiion polemic nas ::r3duced a dcmiinc
effect. Immigration affects a nation i.t several ways:
ethnically, demograpnically, economically,' and :udicially.
The specter of change unsettles many quarters of the puolic,
particularly as France's economy struggles with inflatitn,
unemployment and Euro standards.
Second, some nations seem almost predisposea to anti-
Semitism, xenophobia and racism, a proclivity that effects
internal and external politics. Ironically, the French find
themselves in a paradoxical situation in which they
simultaneously proclaim the notion of equality, and yet
maintain a history of unequal, discriminatory treatment of
immigrants. A nation's ability to weave varied cultures
into its fabric is of fundamental importance as the 10th
century .closes on a multicultural note. Those nations that
are unsuccessful in recognizing and accommodating distinct
cultures will not be able to function socially, politically,
and culturallv as a nation.
*Jacob Burckhardt, Reflections on History (Indianapolis:
Liberty Classics, 1979): 237.
Third, France's role in international and European
ooiitics has been consistently shrouded with "French"
caranoia. The French insist on their position as a v;orld
oower and their desire to maintain a French identity. The
French identity crisis may further complicate the
orecarious relations within the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, as v;ell as other alliances and agreements that
reauire a French vote.
II. FRENCH NATIONALISM AND THE CONCEPT OF THE NATION
It is ccmmoniy said that in this fertile
country, on this territory so well marked out by
nauure, rhe emergence of a greac people v/as to
be expected. Such a statement confuses result
and cause ... France is the work zz man's
intelligence and will.'
One concept of a nation refers to the total copulation,
individual or multiple nationalities, which inhabits a
common territory and is governed under :ne rule. Anotner
definition refers to ethnonational groups that do not assert
any relations to state borders." "Nationhood" also implies
a spiritual sense of unity between the masses and the
nation. The spiritual unity, a necessary precondition of
nationhood, is described as the "...'community of feelings
and ideas concerning certain fundamental problems, a certain
identity in the way of conceiving the external v/orld, of
classifying its objects, of ordering its values, in short a
-Gordon Wright, France in Modern Times (New York: '.'/.W.
Norton & Company, Inc., 1981): 3.
^Walker Connor, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist
Theory and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1984) : 9.
:eri:ain unmy or spiritual orientation, a certain common
— I It 7
. U .
The nation encompasses the unity between mind and
ieeling, impiicit or explicit.' "The nation, m the last
resort and the most fundamental, is a cultural unit."^
national self -consciousness links the tangible attributes of
language and religion. "The prime requisite is subjective
and consists of the self -identification of people witn a
group- -its past, its present, and most important, its
mv . " '''
Ernest Renan described the nation as "...a soul, a
spiritual principle ...[ it is based on] the common possession
of a rich legacy of memories from the past and the consent
in the present, the desire to live together and the will to
continue to develop one's heritage. "^^
The French Revolution of 1789, more than any other
event, is evocative of "...a more powerful or influential
image than that of a national community coming together to
"Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1976): 95.
^Ibid.
-Ibid.
-^Walker Connor, " Self -Determination : The New Phase, " World
Politics . No. 1 (October 1967): 30.
"Theodore Zeldin, France 1848-1945: Intellect and Pride
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980): 13-14.
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reshape its desniny."-' The French Revolution of 1789 v;as
the quintessential act of French nanionaiism.
The revolution msuituted the slogan of "Liberty,
Fquality, Fraternity" and the concept of homeland. Tet,
most significantly, the French Revolution unleased a fury
'.vhich later "...merged into a 'world revolution of the
west, ' or an 'Atlantic revolution, ' introducing an age of
liberalism and democracy.""
The mere event and the repercussions prompted by the
Frencn Revolution have been at the center of ideological,
philosophical and political debates since 1"89. 3ome
observers have asserted that France's current problems stem
from the revolution and its legacy, and "...it follows that
to save the nation, the revolution and its mythology in the
present must be destroyed. ""-^
Other critics, such as Jacob Burckhardt, credited
the French Revolution "with having aided such concepts
as equality before the law, religious and political
equality, freedom of industry, and freeaom to transfer
"David Kaiser, Politics and War: European Conflicts from
Philip II to Hitler (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990)
266.
13Gordon Wright, France in Modern Times , op. cit. : 41.
^^J.S. McClelland, ed. , The French Right (From de Maistre to
Maurras
)
(New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1970) : 15.
real estate. Eut he contended that en balance it v;as
the source of many evils. To him the French Revolution
appeared to be basically as unfree as a forest fire:
It would spread, destroying values.-'
3urc>:hardt continued by stating that the revolution's rr.aior
evil v.-as its "authorization to perpetual revision. "-° Tnis
prophetic insight by Burckhardt illustrates ihe extent m
vinich the French Revolution would be the subject of
interpretation and analysis as the founding event cf French
nationhood*'. It siiriilarly exposes the incendiary poteniial
of nationalism.
Alexis de Rccqueville, also an ardent critic vino
believed that the French P.evolution resulted in the
strengthening of the state and jeopardized liberty, later
wrote in awe of the French Revolution.
A great enterprise was really opening. Its magnitude,
its beauty, its risks were now visible. This great
sight gripped and enraptured the imagination of the
whole French people. In the presence of this immense
design there was a moment when thousands of individuals
completely forgot their particular interests to dream
only of the common achievements. This lasted but for
a moment, but that moment was perhaps unexampl-id in
the history of any other people.*^
^^Jacob Burckhardt, Reflections on History , op. cit.: 20.
-^Ibid.
-'Francois Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution (Paris:
Editions de la Maison des Sciences de 1 ' Homme , 1981)
.
-^David Kaiser, Politics and War: European Conflict from
Philip II to Hitler , op. cit.: 266-267.
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The Frencn Revolution v/as a distinctive milestone for
ics time. "Something special, different m degree and
pernaps m kina, did happen in France; social and
ideological conflict: reached a point of greater intensiiy
ihan in any other part of the Atlantic world, and tnus
foresnadowed revolutionary changes of zhe future."'"
The Frencn RevoluEion of 17 89 and che European
revolutions vyhich were subsequently spawned revealed the
potency of nationalism. French nationalism subsequently
transcended into revanchism, racism, navitism, anti-
Semitism, xenophobia, anti-Americanism and anti-Isiamism.
French heads of state, from Napoleon to Charles de Gaulle,
literally took on the mantle of French identity, speaking of
themselves and of France as one and the same.
19th and 20th century forces have reached a peak. The
post-Cold War era is witness to conflicts instigated and
waged in the name of nationalism, and ethnic strife appears
to have replaced the class conflict that called botn sides
in the cold war to arms. In order to fully grasp the
complexities and malevolence of nationalism, one must
examine the genesis of the nation and the requirements of
citizenship.
-'Gordon Wright, France in Modern Times , op. cit.: 42
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A. THE NATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Since the French Revolution, "citizenship has
"raditionaily been linked to nationality in France.""
The entitlement to citizenship directly equated to an
individual's judicial rights under the law, as well as an
individual's legal recognition by the nation-state. An
individual v/as either regarded as a national, oitzoyen, and
rhus entitled and guaranteed full privileges or a non-
national, stranger , and was excluded from full or direct
political and economic participation within zhe nation-
state. "The rights of citizenship (and, at the same zim.e,
the process of exclusion) have, in fact, become
systematically institutionalized in the formation of the
French nation-state."^^
The Constitution of Year I of 1793 declared that French
citizenship could be achieved by simply accomplishing civic
tasks. '^^ "Any foreigner was regarded as French if they
lived in France for one year, worked, acquired property,
married a Frenchwoman, adopted a child or fed and cared for
-°Ibid., 333.
-^Ibid., 334.
"Catherine Wihtol de VJenden, "Immigration Policy and the
Issue of Nationality," Ethnic and Racial Studies , Vol.14, No. 3,
July 1991, 329.
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"he elderly. "•'^ These requirements laid ground for ~he
foundation for jus de soli, the law of soil, '.vhich maae
citizenship contingent on the will co assimilate into tne
French body politic, as opposed to jus sanguinis , the law of
blood, which posited blood and biology as the oasis of
citizenship.
As the 19th century progressed, there arose an intention
to constrain the exercise of political power, .Tiodified tne
concept and definition of citizenship.-' The definition of
citizenship and the French National Code v/ere revised
countless times reflecting calculated elements of inclusion
and exclusion.
In the 20th century, the debate over citizenship based
on JUS de soli and jus de sanguinis turned into a Europe-
wide debate. In 1983, citizenship and the dubious question
of entitlement became issues on the forefront of the French
immigration debate.
The citizenship debate contradicts the universaiist tone
of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, which the French
proudly trumpet, and illustrates the extent to which this
problem is rooted in French society. The current French
-^Alain de Benoist, "Citoyennete, nationalite, integration,"
Elements, Avril 1993, 56,
"^Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, " Immigration Policy and the
Issue of Nationality," op. cit.: 329.
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citizenship polemic is not based on racial preferences, but
an attempt to deny particular ethnonational groups ii.e.,
Ilorth Africans, specifically Algerian immigrants and ibeir
children) legitimate recognition and acceptance as French.
According to Article 44 of the Nationality Code,
children born on French soil are automatically enticled co
French nationality v/nen they reach the age of 18 years and
v/nen they have resided in France for the preceding five
•/ears. Many opponents of this arrangement claim ~hat these
people are Francais de papier, only French on paper.-'
The issue of citizenship with its patterns of legal
privilege and exclusion affect most categories of post-1945
immigrants, in addition to immigrants born in France, and
are the consequence of earlier state definitions of the
boundary and character of the French nation. ^^
"It was this institutionalized process that transformed
the hazy distinction between nationals and non-nationals
into a clear division between them. The demarcation of two
separate identities is, at the same time, the construction
of inequalities between them. "^"^
^^Ibid., 326.
•^^Robert Miles and Jeanne Singer-Kerel , "Introduction",
Fthnic and Racial Studies , Vol. 14, No. 3, July 1991, 268.
-'Maxim Silverman, "Citizenship and the Nation-State of
France," Ethnic and Racial Studies , Vol. 14, No. 3, July 1991,
335.
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THE MYTH OF THE NATION
The famous hexagon can itself be seen as a colonial
empire shaped over the centuries: ?. complex of
terriuories conquered, annexed, and integrated in a
political and administrative whole, "any of them
with strongly developea national or regional
personalities, some of them with traditions chat
were specifically un- or anti-French.-^
France, custcmiarily viewed as a cohesive, hom.ogeneous
nation, is a nation-state v;ith multiple ::ivisions. diverse
fragments have split the nation both vertically and
hori cental ly. The French state according tc Fugen V.'eber, in
Peasants into Frenchmen , '.vas v/ithout a national
consciousness until the later 19th century. France as a
nation existed only in the eyes of the urban populace of
Paris and was virtually an unknown entity to the rural
peasant
.
To be sure, " . . .France was one of the first nation-
states in Europe, but for long its unity v/as felt
consciously more by its rulers than by its people. "-° The
concept of national recognition within France's borders was
not far beyond the perimeter of Paris. France, as such, was
a myth.
-^Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchjnen , op. cit.: 485.
-^^Theodore Zeldin, France 1848-1945: Intellect and Pride ,
op. cit . : 4
.
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Divided intio a multitude of etnnonational groups, France
did not function as a melded entity, yet as individual
nations. A peasant associated and identified ardently with
a region (Brittany, Ilormandy, Limousin, etc.). Regions
maintained distinctive languages, cultures and mores. Rural
France, by and large, lived in a separate, isolated world of
their own.
The myth of the nation was further amplified by
historical accounts '.vhich revealed that the rural peasant
w^3 ignorant of national crises. Many peasants were unaware
of the Franco-Prussian \-^a.r of 187 0-71, and if they vvere
conscious of the event, their sympathies were towards the
Prussians, not the French. Similarly, many peasants were
unaware of significant political and diplomatic agreements
or of religious figures; the Franco-Russian Alliance and of
Joan of Arc.
The concept of the nation of France was as foreign soil
to peasants. Peasants did not possess any sense of
allegiance to France. Allegiance was only to the village.
Young men were known to perform acts of self -mutilation to
avoid national military service and remain in their village.
Inter-marriages between villages was deemed an intolerable
act. Peasants viewed anything outside of village borders as
foreign and alien.
16
The quest for a conscious national, identity within
French borders revealed the extent of France's regionalism
and brought zo light the segregation chat exisued between
"he rural peasant who spoke patois and che urban bourgeois
who spoke French. Adoiphe Blanqui recounted how " . . . che
urban and rural civilization has always move at a different
pace, 'but nowhere is the distance separating them greaner
than in France. ' '"''
The success of French nationalism, according to VJeoer,
came with the nationwide dissemination of the national rnynh.
Modernization and nationalism were spread co rural France
through various mechanisms: extensive cranspomauion
(roads, railroads, communications), introduction of a
national language (French) and obligatory military service.
The transformation from rural to urban, uncivilized to
civilized. Patois to French was a difficult undertaking
which took generations to take root. Although uhe
acculturation transformation was met witri resistance cy zhe
peasant, the elites desire to unite France spiritually,
culturally and linguistically served to create a nation.
= Ibid., 10.
17
C. AMBIVALENCE OF THE MASSES
Sugen Weber's depiction cf the rural French _:easant
forcS'-. out of the isolation of the village and coerced into
becoming a French citizen suggests the ambivalent experience
of the peasant masses. The peasant v/as viewed as inferior
to the urban bourgeois, either from his inability or
unwillingness to speak French, or from his dress, mannerisms
and actions. As one bourgeois said: peasants were
"'intellectually several centuries behind the enlightened
part or the country' . . .there was 'an enormous distance
betv.'een them and us... between those who speak the language
and those many of our compatriots [who] , cruel as it is to
say so, can no more stammer in it. ' "^^
The peasant was regarded as uncivilized and the
indignation spread by the bourgeois resulted in further
segregation. Peasants were many times distrustful of the
urban class and decidedly turned inward attempting to
solidify the mores and traditions of the village and
rejected modernization.
"The peasant had to be integrated into the national
society, economy, and culture: the culture of the city and




"...approached change hesitantly and experienced ics effects
v/ith great ambivalence. But once they had drunk of ics
fountain, "here was no turning oack.
"
"
. . . 3y uhe end of the century, "he nature of "he r.agic,
and the authority on which it: was accepted, had profoundly
changed. People still took their cultural norms and
assumptions from others; but popular and elite cultures nas
come together again. "'^
Although the peasant was assimilated and completed the
acculturation process, a form of ambivalence remained
solidly implanted in France. France's involvement m
imperialism provided an additional source of amDivalence.
The 19th century was the advent of French imperialism.
"
. .Many Frenchjnen had no clear idea of why (or whether) they
wanted colonies..."'"^, yet the imperial acquisitions
provided France with national prestige and economic
benefits
.
"The revolution of 1848 brought the most dramatic cnange
in the history of French colonialism."'^ The republicans,
of the time, instituted a policy of assimilation. The
policy "rested on the assumption that all men are free and
^^Ibid., 496.
-^Gordon Wright, France in Modern Times , op. cit.: 198
-^Ibid., 199.
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equal, and that the overseas possessions ought to be
integral, self-governing parts of France. "'° later in the
period prior to '."Jorld 'var I, non-economic motivations .;ere
reflected in France's policy toward imperial holds. The
aspiration v/as to christianize and "civilize" the indigenous
population .
'
Here again emerges the internal contradicticn of French
nationalist policy. The indigenous coloniax populations
t once touted as "equals" but, like the peasanu, ihey
_^^__.ired civilizing. Furthermore, the im.periaiisiis "...v.-ere
faced v/ith the problem of reconciling their belief in the
superiority of the French race with a willingness to adm.it
conquered peoples into the fold of the nation."'"
VJith the advent of the "Glorious Thirties", came
immigrants, who were systematically imported and recruited,
and afforded m.ost rights, excluding citizenship. Unlike the
rural French peasant, the immigrant - like the indigenous
colonial population, was a non-national and juridically
remained an etranger
.
The French systematically, consciously or not,
instituted a policy of exclusion and fueled by nationalism.
^^Ibid.
= 'Ibid., 299.
-'Theodore Zeldin, France 1848-1945: Tntellect and Pride ,




citizenship and nationality became major sources of
exclusion^' for the immigrant and later evolved into a form
of social dommauion.
D. THE CONCEPT OF THE FOREIGNER
"The expansion of the state thus provides uhe
concrete foundations of the modern distinction between the
national and the f oreigner . . . ""^^ As the state matured,
national recognition became conscious and as immigration
developed, the segregation oetween national and non-national
became prevalent and outbreaks of anti-Semitism, ::enopnoDia,
racism and nativism surfaced.
In the eyes of the French, the foreigner has many
faces. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the Jew was
predominantly regarded as first alien in residence and in
the 20th century, the foreigner consists of immigrants and
the children they engender.
As foreigners, Jews and immigrants have corn the clunt
of integral nationalism.
'^Maxim Silverman, "Citizenship and the Nation-State in




France's strong tradition of anti-Semitism is sewn
into the fabric of the nauion itself. The spread of anti-
Semitism IS comcidentaily related to the revolt against
usury from 1848-52. "...The strong identification of the
Jew and the usurer v/as a significant feature of the
nationalist politics of the Third Republic . '"^^
.\nti-Semitism additionally festered within "he
debate over the theory of man. J.S. McClelland stated that
"using the concept of the Fall of Man, of m.an as an
instinctual savage requiring total leadership and repeated
bloodletting, a number of elitist, racist and totalitarian
dreamers and publicists have offered an alternative
statement of the human condition.'"'^
France's anti-Semitism was firmly inserted within
the intellectuals and the Academie Francaise (French
Academy) . Renowned philosophers the likes of Gorbineau, de
Maistre, Taine, Drumont, Earres and Maurras inoculated the
enlightened nation with a serum of racist and anti-Semitic
theories and ideologies.
^^Fugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchjnen , op. cit.: 39.
'^J.S. McClelland, The French Right fFrom de Maistre to
Maurras
)
, op. cit.: editor's preface.
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Le Comte de Gobineau, as described by Hannah Arendt
was a "curious mixture of frustrated nobleman and romannic
intellectual '.vno invented racism almost by accidenu . ""^^
Gobineau methodically "...identified che fall of his casue
with the fall of France, then of Western civilization, and
then of the whole mankind. ""^ He asserted that "he decline
and ultimate fall of nations was due to the degeneration of
race and the mixture of blood. Thus, a race ideology was
pioneered. Gobineau believed that:
one enters neither a family nor a nation through a
decision. The olood which one has m one's veins
at birth one keeps all one's life. The individual
is stifled by his race and is nothing. The race, the
nation, is all.^^
Some philosophers were regarded as "...Jew-baiters,
dealing in scandal and the direct lie,""*^ while others
utilized the Jew as an ideogram which served " . . . as a
shorthand for certain attitudes and doctrines..." of which
they disapproved. ^"^
^^Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1951): 172.
^^Ibid.
^^Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1966): 280-281.
^^J.S. McClelland, The French Right (From de Maistre to
Maurras
)
, op. cit.: 30.
"Ibid.
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Edouard Drumont, who published a l"/;o volume novel
entitled La France Juive (Jewish France), believed in a
Jewish conspiracy to take over France and Europe. /Jhile
Maurice Barres, v/ho was regarded as ~he high priesu of
nationalism"^, believed in the notion of "...deracine - che
rootless, cosmopolitan metic - and harnessed it to a
mystical nationalism. "^^
Commonly, all the staunch preachers of anti-Semicism
professed that the Jew was corrupt, rotten, foreign, and
mosL importantly, a threat to Franc-^.
As Theodore Zeldin points out:
It was nhe basis of such respectable authorities, and
of all this scientific research, chat nationalist
movements of the twentieth century built their theories
about the need to exclude foreigners from France and
to 'keep the French race pure' .-°
2. French Declination
The concept of French domination finds its roots in
the French self-imposed sense of superiority and was
augmented by the experience of imperialism. Although France
professed a policy of equality and liberty for the realm of
conquered peoples, the French never quite adhered to the
'^Ibid., 143.
^^Ibid.
-^Theodore Zeldin, France 1845-1945: Intellect and Pride ,
op . cit . : 13 .
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concept. Superficially, the policy was promulgated, but: in
reality, the French believed themselves ~o be superior.
With the advent of immigration, the Frencn
conveniently dominated the migrating masses and v/ere
subsequently successful in maintaining tneir commanaing
hold.
In 1988, Theodore Zeldin v/rote that immigrant
workers in France were a new sort of slave. "Immigrants do
most of the dirty and worst paid ^obs; their children, born
in France, do not get much chance of obtaining oetter .-:inds
of employment; so they form an almost hereditary
underprivileged caste. "^"'- In 1993, not much has changed in
regards to the social status and acceptance of ixmmigrants
and their children.
Immigrants are regarded as foreigners and non-
nationals, and essentially not privy to any benefits and
privileges that the nation-state offers its "own" populace.
The French legal system has throughout the centuries r:ept
immigrants at arms length. Immigrants were rigorously
assimilated and integrated to fit into the French mold, yet
they are still not tout a fait (completely) French.
Immigrants are "defined progressively as a group to be
'^Theodore Zeldin, The French (London: Collins Harvill
1988) : 441.
25
surveyed and controlled rather than as individuals before
the law. "'^
France is a country of with an over -abundance of
tertiary occupations.'' Tertiary occupations, such as
domestic servants using primitive household equipment, hand
labor to clean streets, toilet facility attendants and
concierges, are regarded as a great waste of labor.-" In
these occupations is where most immigrant emplo\Tnent is
concentrated. The utilization of several immigrant v/orkers
to perform the job of one is indicative of France's
"...traditional attachment to the lavish use of unskilled
labor. "^^ The cost to employ these workers is minimal, the
jobs are readily filled if vacated by another immigrant and
the French employers maintains a position of dominance over
the immigrant workers
.
A vast majority of immigrants are victims of
economic discrimination, and with the continual immigration
influx into the country, it is unlikely that their economic
deprivation will be ameliorated. Although it is not openly
'-Maxim Silverman, "Citizenship and the Nation-State in
France," op. cit.: 340.
--Arnold M. Rose, Migrants in Europe ;Minneapolis : The




endorsed, a predominant feeling is that if an immigrant
feels discriminated and overv/helmed by the dominant French,
"hen to remedy uhe problem, "hey should return no cheir
-zountry of origin.
French domination will persist as long as the French
possess an economic advannage and maintain nheir cultural
and linguistic superiority over the immigrann
.
3. The French Equation
In France today, the notion of irrmigres (immigrants)
refers implicitly to les Arabes (Arab) . '" And, ic is cne
Arab population, which adheres to Islam, that many French
believe pose a threat to the French nation-state.
The association made between the words "immigrant"
and "Arab" leads to another word amalgamation. Since a
majority of immigrants emigrate from North Africa, there is
additionally an association with the words "Arab" and "North
African.
"
The two terms, Arab and immigrant, possess such
diametric definitions, but are utilized as synonyms. The
two words are commonly interchanged as one in the same.
'^Robert Miles and Jeanne Singer-Kerel , "Introduction," op
cit. : 272.
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This faci: is illusurative of France's bias towards Arabs and
in parnicuiar, Algerians.
Among the Magnrebin population, / yerians are looked
upon v/ith a r.osn discerning Frencn eye. Moroccans and
Tunisians are more readily tolerated than any Algerian.
A logical explanacicn lies in France's historical and
imperial ties v/ith North Africa and specifically Algeria.
The imiperialistic venture into Algeria, -::r-zh ultimauely
ended in a six year v/ar , left the French embittered to such
an exnent ihat hateful sentiments remain co this day.




Within France, statistics have revealed that North
Africans, consisting of Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians
are the most numerous of immigrants. And, with regard to
public opinion polls, Arabs are deemed in excess.
Current relations between France and Algeria have
been and remain tenuous and stressed, thus amplifying French
hostility towards Algerian immigrants. Recent quarrels have
pertained to the legal disposition of immigrants denied
entrance into France and the status of children born to
immigrants. The two nations remain jadea oy a past





The end result is that many Arabs are overwhelmed by
their sense of failure, by their inability no master an
alien way of life.'' The majority occupy low paying : ods
and see no means of acceptance.
By and large, Arabs have come to represent and
refract the crisis of the French nation-state m the
1980s. ^3
4 . The Second Generation
A racialized concept of nationality excludes from
full citizenship not only non-European immigrants
but also their children who were born m France,
have French nationality and yet ^re not considered
as legitimate French citizens.''
The term "Second Generation" is commonly used to
describe a generation engendered by immigrants. Confusion
arises when this particular generation is regarded as a
"second generation" of immigrants. The offspring of
immigrants are not migrants, emigrants and seventy-percent
of them, born in France, have not inherited a emigrant
-"Theodore Zeldin, The French , op. cit.: 452.
-^Robert Miles and Jeanne Singer-Kerel , "Introduction," op
cit. : 273
'^Maxim Silverman, "Citizenship and the Nation-State in
France," op. cit.: 340.
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culture . "'-^ For the purposes of this thesis, the term
"second generation" v/ill be strictly applied to refer zd
children of immigrants - beurs and beurectes - and children
cf mixed marriages. The uerm is applicable in both
instances since the offspring equally suffer from a culture
gap, 3 tereot\T)ing, a lack of acceptance and belong to ihe
same confused generation.
The lerm Eeur, '.vhich refers to young Franco-
"aghrebis, is the reversal of the word arab, v/nen pronounced
_n verlan - a slang language. Seurs or Eeureztes (the
feminine of Beur) are no longer spoken of as Maghrebins
since they generally speak little to no Arabic and only
seldom oractice the Islam of their parents. ""-^ Select Beurs
have su(-.,essfully perforated France's elite schools and
visible professions. Beurettes are shedding their veils of
rot^-^ol and are adamantly articulating their
-renchness. Arranged marriages, large families, financial
dependence, limited education and subservience to males have
been exchanged for a modern VJestern lifestyle. Education is
regarded as a Beurette ' s ticket to freedom."^ 1980
'^°Domi-^iaue Schnapper, La France de 1 ' integration (Editions
Gallimard, 19^91) : 167^
"Ronald Koven, "Muslim Immigrants and French nationalists,"
Society , May/June 1992, 26.
^^Ibid.
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statistics revealed that foreign students surpassed French
students in higher education by 6 to 13 percent.''^
Although education has promoted the social status cf
the Beur, a vast majority sense alienation and rejection by
French society and lack the familiarity to return to tne
Maghreb. Consequently, "many have dropped out of school,
some have succumbed to heroin or other drugs, still others
have adopted a routine of petty crime to make ends meet."""*
"...Flashes of urban unrest led the Socialist government to
identify 400 'highly volatile' areas - 15 of wnich are in
Marseilles - where the combination of high illiteracy,
school dropouts, joblessness and concentration of immigrant
families makes them ripe for social explosions.""^
Many districts in question are not considered
ghettos, yet representative of "a poor France, where the
unemployment rate is close to 20 percent; where the school
drop out rate has risen; where the attendance rate in
college is the weakest in the area; where incomes as a whole
- out of 8000 residents, in which approximately 30 percent
^'"Enquete, " L' Express . 14 Juin 1991, 48.
^'^William Drozdiak, "The French Ask: Can L.A. Happen
Here?," The Washington Post . 12 May 1992.
"Ibid.
31
are Maghrebin - are low, because this community is poorly
qualified. "'°
Young Beurs are commonly si:ereoT:\'T)ed as delinquents
or casseL:rs. Many teenagers nave complained of police
harassment v/herein they are repeatedly asked to show their
identity papers.'"^ And in regard to the educauion system, a
iiscouraging stereotype prevails: "to professors, ihe
aghrebin can only be a mason. ""^
Although many Eeurs have refuted employment sim.ilar
10 chat of cheir parenus and desire an amelioraced
lifestyle, "...they do nothing to insert "hemselves into
society and do not even attempt to surmount their
handicaps . "^^ In aggravation of an already precarious
situation, the government has been unable to commit large
sums of money for educational programs or job promotion.
r^>.aaitionally, affirmative action programs are non-existent
in France. ^°
"Christian Jelen, "La Face Cachee de 'Ghettos,'" Le Point ,
4 Mars 1991, 53
.
-'^Steven Greenhouse, "Arab Youths in France: Their .Anger
Boils Over," The New York Times , 19 October 1990.
^^Christian Jelen, "La Face Cachee des 'Ghetitos, '" op. cit.
55.
^'Ibid.






Racism against the second generation indicates that
French society must deracialize and denationaiize itseif
when in fact symbols and practices or the nation-state are
racialized. -
Immigrants and their children are a form of
diaspora, "that segment of people living outside tne
homeland."'" According to VJalker Connor, "diasporas are
viev/ed at best as outsiders, strangers within the gates."
And, although members of the diaspora may contribute
significantly to the environment, "they remain outsiders in
the eyes of the indigenes, who reserve the inalienaDle right
to assert their primary and exclusive proprietary claim to
the homeland, should they so desire. "^-^
The French, in the position of the homeland dwelling
people or the indigenous ethnonational group, regard
themselves as possessing "...a primal power to determine who
shall and who shall not be permitted to reside therein."'^
Walker Connor's asserts, relative to diasporas
people, that:
'^^Maxim Silverman, "Citizenship and the Nation-State m
France," op. cit.: 342.
'"Walker Connor, "The Impact of Homelands upon Diasporas,
in Gabriel Sheffer, ed. , Modern Diasporas in International




MemDers of a diaspora can therefore never be au home in
a homeland. They are at best sojourners, remaining an
the sufferance of the indigenous people /-
?his statement appropriately describes the condition of many
.mmiarants and their children in France.
:bid.
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III. NATIONALISM, XENOPHOBIA & RACISM
IN THE PAST AND PRESENT
Both Frenchmen and France... are nouoriousiy
complex, varied, muitif aceted, :ften contradictory
and baffling, difficult to imprison wiuhin neau
definitions
.
Luigi Barzini, "T'he E'lropeans
France, as ail nations, possesses uraits and distmc-cive
characiieristics v/hich are unique to its nation and cuicure.
Yet, France has nourished a fear of foreigners. This
xenophobia stems from the Franco-Prussian v/ar and World Wars
I & II, as well as the unique French sense of excellence and
superiority. On one hand, the nation has a painful history
of humiliating defeat and on the other hand, 11 has felt
compelled to fend off foreign influences v;hich threatened to
alter French ways, ideas, styles, tastes and language.
France's xenophobic proclivity has tarnished its
reputation as a safe haven and asylum for the persecuted
masses and has ultimately manifested into a racist lean.
The "...French people have made their own distinctive
contribution to the evolution of racist ideologies in Europe
35
and 10 racist practices within and beyond the boundary of
the French nation-state. . . "'°
Claims have been made tnat "historical and contemporary
influence of racism in France... is necessarily refractea
through the prism of class conflicts." ' This proclamation
further asserts that:
•Jhen It is suggested that the Jacobin tradition of
universalism is a vehicle for the legitimation of
racism by '/irtue of its apparent requirement mat
immigrants 'assimilate' to French culture, it snouid
be remembered that the very same ideological tradition
has oeen used historically to subordinate earlier
additions to the French working class, additions tnat
originated from rural France rather than from tne
Maghreb
.
VJorld War II illustrated that France v/as negligent in
constraining her xenophobic and racial anxieties as
evidenced by episodes of anti-semitism, which were prevalent
until 1945 and are currently resurfacing, after a quasi-
lethargic period. Xenophobic and racist inclinations are
further exhibited in anti- immigration, anti-Maghrebin and
anti-American sentiments.





The French "...never hide cheir amused ccncempi: of
foreigners..."'^ or anything foreign. They nave
successfully braved most attempts of foreign permeation and
this resiliency has even spilled over into foreign policy,
i.e., NATO
.
This antagonism towards foreigners nas catapulted France
into an identity crisis, with French and foreigner on
diametric sides. The French feel invaded; the foreigner
rejected and the Second Generation, spawned from immigrants
and mixed marriages, "stand ambiguously oetween Arao and
French civilization. "^°
A. THE PAST
Je sens se lever un vent mauvais
(I feel a bad wind rising)
.
Philippe Petain^-
France has "...had a terrible tradition of open
racism. "^^ Elements of the extreme right were m existence
in the late 1700 's and flourished until 1945. The Dreyfus
'^^Luigi Barzini, The Europeans (London: Penguin Books,
1983) : 120.
^"Theodore Zeldin, The French , op. cit.; 455.
^^Edwy Plenel et Alain Rollat, La Repupliaue Menacee: Dix
Ans D'Effect Le Pen (Le Monde-Editions, 1992): 356.
^^Daniel Singer, "The resistible rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen,
Ethnic and Racial Studies . Volume 14, Number 3, July 1991, 379.
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Affair, •Jorld VJar II and Vichy France v/ere episodes v/hich
severely tarnished the nation's reputation. In the
aftermath of these shameful experiences, France appeared to
recuperate from her racist ailment. But, the cruth of -he
manter was that the demons of the past v/ere swept under the
convenient rug of the present.
French racism began in the eighteen century. But, it
'.vas not until the end of the nineteenth century and the
Dreyfus affair, ihat the extreme right fanned out: . Anti-
Semites, xenophobes , anti-socialists, neomonarchistes
,
anti-modernists and anticapitalists emerged^' and maintained
one emphatic characteristic, that of nationalism.
"The nationalist defended himself, counterdef inition, as
being against the foreign and the foreigner, whether the
hereditary enemy of the movement, the alien, or the
Protestant. Inevitably, he discovered the Jew as Alien-in-
residence, ubiquitous exploiter, corrupter, and debaucher of
aood citizens . '"''*
"'Michel Winock (ed. ) , Histoire de -'extreme droite en
France (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1993): 9.
'^Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber (eds.), The European Right
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965): 89.
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1. L'Action Francaise
The most 'radical' attack - 'radical' in Chan
it demands a total revaluation of man's place
m socieny and of the suatus of f.iffereni: races
in Lhe general scheme of power and human aignii:;
- has come from the Right.''
The Dreyfus Affair brought the Jewish community into
light and subsequently they became targets of the extrem.e
right, in particular of 1 'Action francaise and its laaaer
Charles Maurras
.
L' Action francaise was not the only right
wing movement of its kind, but was one which was indicative
of right wing ideology and remained active until 1945.
L' Action francaise was a nationalist, pro-catholic
and monarchic movement. They actively boycotted Jewish
establishments, sought to expel Jews from public office and
recruited only catholics. The movement sought homogeneity
though its uniform recruitment of catholics.'^ The
catholic, nationalistic demeanor of the organization
positioned one religious component against another.
The rhetoric that reverberated from meetings was
violently anti-Semitic. Meetings manifested themselves into
rallies against the Jewish community. Chants echoed of
"death to Jews" and "the Dreyfus Affair nas shown us the Jew




op. cit.: editor's preface.
''Ibid., 101.
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m ail his horror.'"^ There v:as even a radicai v;arrior gang
eiement''^ of L ' Aczion francaise , Les Camelocs du F.oi. Les
carr.eloLS v/ere present at gatherings and were authors of
songs such as, La France bouge '.France r:TOves ) , v.'hich v;ere
indicative of l'Ac::ion francais' ideoiogy. Portions of the
song are as foliows:
The Jev; has taken ail,
Enough treason ... insolent Jew, shut up,
Here comes the King, and our race. .
.
,
At your place Jew. . .
.
The rhetoric depicts the Jew as a monopolizer of
wealth, a trader to the nation and belonging to a different
race. Yet most importantly, the Jew is seen as determent to
the nation and requiring constraint and bridling by the
catholics
.
According to Maurras , "...liberty and democracy are
'Jewish'; corrupt finance is 'Jewish'; the rights of man are
'Jewish'; all that tends to break down national difference
is 'Jewish'; all that threatens the France of his
-'Ib^d., 100.
'^Eugen Weber, ^'Fascism, religion and the French Right,"
TLS , 9 July 1993
.
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imagination is 'Jewish.'""^ 'Jewish' T^eant to Maurras
"...rotten, foreign, democratic, libertarian, anui-clerical
,
anti-militarisL , Marxist.'"''
Maurras had a distinct formula chat identified v/nan
he saw as the four confederate states: che protescanL, ihe
jew, manual labor v;orkers and construction v7or:<ers . These
elements were regarded as "foreigners of the interior, v/no
de-stabilized the old regimie v/hile re-estaolisning meir
revolutionary doctrines and who ultimately seized control
after the fall of the old regime. "^-^ Maurras'
classification of states specifically identifiea non-
catholics, protestants and Jews, and immigrants who occupied
those jobs labeled as manual and construction v/orkers
.
Maurras was one the first to regard a foreigner as a
disease to the country. He advocated the "ferocious
rejection of any alteration to the French being by anything
that was foreign. "^^ Maurras claimed that "the barbarians"
needed -to be repelled.
L' Action francaise was a national movement following






re-ignited revanchisme and promoted an anti-German sentiment
throughout the country. It is not surprising nor
inccnceivaDie to understand how uhe movement grev; and gained
increasing popuiarity. I'Accion franchise expanded i~s
suspicion of foreigners to include germans , socialists and
communists
.
Maurras ' held no official position m '/ichy and it
is said that he met Petain only en four occasions.''
"
. . .I'laurras claimed to support Petain because it was through
him alone that he saw hope for a new France. "'"^
nonetheless, Maurras held the Petain inspired title of le
plus Franca: 3 de Francais (the most French of Frenchmen) . ^^
The movement remained active until its official
death in 1945. World War II had a crippling effect on the
movement, causing it to split over their perceived role with
Vichy and German collaboration. Maurras was charged that he
had passed information to the Germans through public
denunciations of individuals''^ and sentenced to life






One astonishing fact is that L 'Action francaise was
never a party. The importance of this assertion is that the
movement "...wanted to affect power and influence society,
but only indirectly, m the role not of executive but of
teacher . "^'^
In the end, two absolute facts prevail. "Maurras
v;as Action Francaise" and "in Maurras and Vichy its
absurdities met."^^
B. THE PRESENT
France is a nation which has suffered from a delusion.
The variegated, multinational state, composed of numerous
ethnic strains, is ethnically heterogenous. Yet, the nation
has maintained a homogeneous vision of itself, known as
Staatsvolk^^ . This misconception has subsequently and
irreversibly spilled over into French society and logic.
Many French, who have been regarded as temperate in
nature 'and hospitable to foreigners, now question the future
of the "French" ethnicity and demand an end to immigration.
This fear of a tainted or mixed culture lingers in France
"Eugen Weber, Action Francaise (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1965): 528.
98 Ibid., 214.
^^Walker Connor, "Beyond reason: The nature of the
ethnonational bond," Ethnic and Racial Studies , Vol. 16, No. 3,
July 1993, 374-379.
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and political forums such as le From National have embraced
-his anxiety. Yet, not only are right wing organizations
receptive to exclusionary pracnices, but ihe average
FrencrjT.an recently has asserted an active role in racism.
1. Le Front National
An element of the extreme right, the Front .lational
(FN) , surfaced m 197 2 and has gained popularity in
suDsequent years. The groups omnipotent leader, Jean-Marie
Le Pen preaches v/ith a racist rhetoric, emohasizing the
motto of France for the French and the concepts of French
aentity and French values, has successively awaken French
nationalism.
Immigration, as a problem on the political agenda,
has become the foundation from which the Front National has
achieved many political objectives. Immigrants are seen as
responsible for the failing economy, mounting unemployment
and the pollution of French blood. The Front National,
typical of most extremist organizations, has utilized
France's economic crises to its advantage and certain
populations of immigrants are deemed responsible. It is
interesting to note that not all immigrants are targeted.
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some "...are more suitable than others when seeking co
locate immigration as a problem. .." ^°°
"...The qualitative evaluation origmaues not m any
particular (real or alleged) cnaracteristic of the
immigrants, but rather in the characteristics of the
situation and, more specifically, in tne eyes of those v.-ho
seek to advance particular political and economic interests
by constituting immigration as a problem. ""^^
Le Pen's anti-immigrant agenda includes an extensive
fifty-point program which advocates Frencn citizensnip oy
birthright; examining all naturalizations since i974;
establishing foreigner quotas in public schools;
interdicting the construction of mosques and Koranic
schools; terminating the family reunification policy;
targeting immigrants in job reductions; reducing social
benefits to immigrants and deporting illegal, unemployed and
criminal . "°^
The program additionally endorses a proposal to
terminate "false tourism" which would require the payment of
100,000 francs to ensure a visitor's departure at the
-°°Robert Miles and Jeanne Singer-Kerel , "Introduction," op
cit: 273.
101 Ibid
-°^Howard LaFranchi, "French Far Right Gains Ground After
Ant i- Immigrant Bid, " The Christian Science Monitor , 26 November
1991, 4.
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conclusion of a sojourn. The Front National has stressed
that this proposal is not intended to apply to Europeans,
"people sharing a common culture or religion."-^'
Le Pen's hateful agenda is not solely directed
towards immigrants, but also reeks of anti-Semitism. In
March 1991, Le Pen '.vas ordered to pay 900,000 francs to nine
organizations representing French deportees when he referred
to gas chambers as a "point of detail." An additional fine
of 10,000 francs was imposed v;hen he insulted a government
minister with a Durafour-crematoire remark. -^^
Le Pen's shocking rhetoric is a form of media
propaganda. The remarks attract media attention, provoke
outrage and ultimately serve to publicize, whether in a good
or bad light, Le Pen and the Front National. The additional
imposition of fines simply provides for more publicity.
The intangible element of the Front National regards
its membership. The radicals of the past which consisted, of
a melange of neo-fascists, old monarchists, catholics,
former Vichy and cadets of the Secret Army Organization^"^
have been replaced by respectable men and women of the
-°^Ibid.
^°''"With Prejudice," The Economist , 6 April 1991, 50.
^°^Marianne Amar et Pierre Milza, L ' immigration en France au
XXe Siecle (Paris: Armand Colin Editeur, 1990): 129.
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present. Current FN membership even consists of the
previous wave of immigrants, the Spanish and Portuguese.
Electoral support for the Front National is not
static. Statistics revealed that male m.anual v;orkers are
increasingly voting for the FN and that a proportion of the
French electorate is partisan and committed to FN support. -°^
"The fundamental mission of the Front National goes
beyond expulsions or issues of citizenship. It consists of
the formation of a state with a totalitarian vocation, that
imposes its own definition of good and bad in all areas,
private lives and mixed societies: 'The personality ana
deposition of the elite should determine that of the
nation. ' " ^"
The evolution of Le Pen and the Front National
,
coupled with everything disparaging that they represent, has
become a source of imitation. Le Pen is not the sole
political figure to become embroiled in derogatory antics.
In the March 1983 elections, the issue of immigration
entered French politics and became the object of bargaining
between rival political leaders. ^°^ Ultimately, "the debate
^°^Robert Miles and Jeanne Singer-Kerel , "Introduction," op.
cit. : 270.
'""^Marianne Amar et Pierre Milza, L ' immigration en France au
XXe Siecle , op. cit.: 130.
-"^Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, "Immigration Policy and the
Issue of Nationality," op. cit.: 323.
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on immigration was transformed into a debate on nationality
and came to focus on complex legal texts that v/ere of little
interest to public opinion. " ^'''^
rorm.er French President and hopeful future
contender, Valery Giscard d'Estaing referred to immigration
as an invasion and contended, as Le Pen, that French
citizenship should be based on "the concept of strict
consanguinity" or jus sanguinis versus ~us soli. This
tactic, -.vhich the first two measures have been already
endorsed by the French parliament, denies automatic
citizenship to immigrant children.
Jacques Chirac, former Prime Minister, presidential
candidate and current R.P.R. leader, has also alarmingly
begun to echo Le Pen rhetoric. In a speech, Chirac referred
to immigration as an "overdose" and recounted how French
workers are "driven crazy" by the "noise and smells" of
immigrant neighbors. He also advocated the dissolution of
the family reunification policy and recommended a reduction
in social security benefits. Startling enough, as a result
of his defamatory speech, Chirac's poll ratings increased
over five percent . "''^°
109 Ibid., 327
-'^Catherine Pegard, "Les Grands Mots," Le Point , 13 Juillet
1991, 17.
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Edith Cresson, Prime Minister in 1991, devised a
plan to deport illegal immigrants via special charters.
Measures included the expulsion of legal immigrants v;no
employed illegal immigrants and the introduction of fixed
date transit visas vice tourist visas to foreigners from
countries regarded as posing an immigration threat.
Finally, even French President Mitterand has been
entangled in a web of anti-immigrant overtones. In 1989, he
was quoted:
A threshold of tolerance was reached in the 1970s when
there v;ere already four million one riundrea thousana to
four million two hundred thousand residency permits
[...]. As much as possible, this number must not be
surpassed. -*^
"Immigration continues to be a pretext for
disagreement and debate between leaders of the main
political parties, even if, privately, they think that their
respective policies are not so different and that there is a
possibility of cross-party agreement (with the exception of
the FN)."^^^ According to Miriam Feldblum
former divisions between the right and left on
immigration issues blurred in the debates on national
identity and national community. Despite the emergence
of some alternative discourse, most on the left and
^^^Edwy Plenel et Alain Rollat, La Repupliaue Menacee: Dix
Ans D'Effect Le Pen , op. cit.: 352.
^^'Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, "Immigration policy and the
Issue of Nationality," op. cit.: 328.
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right rejected the arguments to separate nationality
from citizenship that proponents of the 'new
citizenship' advocated. Rather, they upheld the
divisions between the public status of membership in
the national community and the private status of
reliaion and culture.-"
Anti-immigration sentiments and racially incited
rhetoric are commonplace in contemporary France. Mot only
has the extreme right found a favorable voice in a
population v;here economic difficulties, themes of insecurity
and unemployment are sensitive, but the vast majority of
politicians have served as "...carriers of the infection . " '-'^
A bandwagoning effect has resulted. "The achievement cf Le
Pen and his often unwitting companions has been to render
racism almost respectable ." "-^^
2, Societal Agitations
French racism is very particular form of racism. It
is primarily a silent form of racism, v;hereby the majority
Df French essentially tolerate foreigners and little more.
Overt thoughts of racism are concealed and hostility and
-•^^Miriam Feldblum, "Pe.:adoxes of ethnic politics: The case
of Franco-Maghrebis in France," Ethnic and Racial Studies , Vol.
16, No. 1, January 1993, 56.
^"'^Daniel Singer, "Le Pen Pals-Blood and Soil," The Nation ,
23 December 1991, 315.
^^^Daniel Singer, "The resistible rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen,
"
op . cit . : 379
.
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aggression subdued. Yet, recent episodes reveai chac zhe
silence has been broken and acEs of violence, directed
toward Maghrebins and the Jewish community have resulted.
Since 1980, there is a trena regarding acts of
racism and anti-Semitism, the locality of the incident
(region or department), the number of acts and the
victims.--' French men betv;een the ages of 30 and 59 are
regarded as the most volatile group and the most common
infraction has been verbal abuse."--"
The regions regarded as the most violent, racist and
anti-semitic are lie de France (greater Parisj ana Provence-
Alpes-Cote d'Azur (including Marseille).--^ The rationale
behind the violence in the Paris region is that besides
being a highly populated area, right wing organizations,
nationalists and neo-nazis, as well as skinheads are solidly
implanted in the area. Violence in the Cote d'Azur region
stems from its proximity to the Mediterranean. Large
portions of the Arab immigrants choose to live in the South
where the climate and topography are very similar to that of
their nation of origin.
--^Rapport de la Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits
de I'homme, La Lutte Centre Le Racisme et La Xenophobie Paris:




violent acts that were purposely directed towards
Jews began in the 1980s and v/ere ultimately the result of an
international v/ave of terrorism, as well as specific media
events. Paris v/as the epicenter of Jewish violence in 1982
with the bombing of a synagogue {la rue Copernic) , the
assassination of Yacov Earsimentov and m.achine gun shooting
on the rue des Rosiers .''^
Media coverage has been responsible for increased
acts of violence and racism. Large scale media coverage of
the Claus Barbie trail and the Carpentras cemetery
desecration ironically incited sentiments of anti-Semitism.
Additionally, the Gulf War incited anti-Semitism, as '.veil as
anti-Maghrebin sentiments.
3 . Pxiblic Opinion Polls
Since the latter 1960s, public opinion polls
regarding immigration have been conducted to reveal the
extent of racism in France. In November 1992, the Institut
Cr-^.seil-Sondages-Analyses Commission conducted a poll -which
included 1017 people, 18 years of age and older. Questions
focused on individual perceptions, the victims, religion.
--^Ibid., 29.
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the economy and the magnitude of racism m France. A
synopsis of the findings is as follows.--'^
Racism v/as regarded as a distant and less urgenu
phenomena and ranked fifth among dangers v;hich cnreaten zhe
world. Hunger, AIDS, pollution and discrimination preceded
racism in the rankings.
Maghrebins , nomads [Gitans or Tziganes) and Beurs
were the specific ethnic groups which the French maintained
an aversion. This illustrates that Maghebins and Eeurs are
commonly the victims of racism.
Regarding the number of immigrants, polling data
reflected that the majority felt that there were too many
Arabs and Muslims living in France and one third felt that
there were enough immigrants living in their respective
community.
In reference to immigrants seeking safe haven, 3 5
percent believed that France should cease to welcome
political refugees, 37 percent judged that acceptance should
be based on political and not economical considerations, and
only 24 percent affirmed that France should continue to be
an asylum.
The issue of religion and the construction of
mosques provided interesting results. 47 percent of the
^2°Ibid., 55-58.
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French viho v/ere questioned believed that there 7/ere a
sufficient number of mosques in France, 22 percent felt that
there v/ere too many and 11 percent believed that there '.vere
not enough. Additionally, one in two people questioned
opposed the construction of a mosque in their quarter, v/hile
14 percent v/ere favorable to m.osque construction and 2 2
percent v/ere indifferent.
Results pertaining to the economy v/ere equally
puzzling and responses v/ere contradictory. 5 9 percent of
the French questioned estimated that immigrants should
consider themselves at home in France since they contribute
to the French economy. Only 27 percent felt that immigrants
working in France constituted a positive effect to the
economy and 63 percent felt that immigrants overload the
economy.
A final result revealed that 56 percent of those
interviewed staunchly maintained that they do not feel at
home in France anymore.
The poll is indicative of a France which is split on
the issue of immigrants and, more precisely, reflective of
how the overwhelming majority of French feel about
immiaration.
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IV. NATIONALISM AND IMMIGRATION
. . . Iminigration reveais more aDouL Frencn sccie-iy
than about immigration itself. It probes the
deepest recesses of che French psycne, residing
as it does in the realm of fantasy and
representation, in che political imaginary and ihe
social esthetic, and remaining largely over-
determined bv history.-"
France has long been regarded as a society of
immigration, yet the opposite is more appropriaue . During
uhe 18th century, France attracted few foreigners and many
French migrated due to religious prosecutions, economic
motivations or they sought to colonize unexplored lands,
like Quebec or Louisiana. -^^^
As a result of many revolutionary wars, specifically the
Napoleonic wars, and a low fecundity rate, France suffered
from a demographic hemorrhage . ^^^ Hence, the phenomena known
as imnjigration began at the beginning of the 19th century.
---Catherine VJihtol de Wenden, "North African Immigration and
the French Political Imaginary," op. cit.: 98.
-^^L ' integration a la Francaise (Pans: Union Generale
d'Editions, 1993) : 21.
-^^Ibid.
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History illustrates that "large scale immigration, and
especially labour migration, has been an important
structural feature of the evolution of the French nation-
state and French capitalism since the late-13th century.''"'
A. THE FRENCH MODEL OF INTEGRATION
The nistory of immigration to France is closely linked
.vith France's development of a national identity. "France
is composed of m.any ethnonational groups - Celts, Germ.ans
,
latins, Mormands , Basques, Jews, etc.; but has never
permitted them to subsist as an equal. The initial French
immigration formula engendered Frenchmen and -women out of
the sundry of masses that permeated her frontiers. France,
without any pity, crushed, pulverized and digested each and
every one of them."^"
This strategy suffocated all remnants of the immigrants
'
cultural origin and extensively assimilated them into French
society. Immigrants adopted not only the French language
and culture, but habits and ideas . ^'^^
--^Robert Miles and Jeanne Singer-Kerel , "Introduction," op.
cit.: 274.
-'^"Le Grand Defi de 1 ' immigration en France," Jeune Afriaue ,
27 Novembre-3 Decembre 1991, 25.
-^Ibid.
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The only integration model that France has ever known,
was that of assimilation."^^ The French nanion-state, as
shown by Ernest Renan, was a nation based on certain
principles. The first and foremost principle was "he
dissipation of ethnic and cultural diversity and the
imposition of a homogeneous national group. -"^
After the French Revolution, other instruments of
integration were obligatory military service, as a school of
the nation^*^', and education. France always applied the
Montaigne principle: It is the rule of rule and the general
law of laws, that everyone should observe the rules and laws
where they reside or where they were born.--°
Immigration was essential to the industrial growth of
the nation. France actively recruited immigrants and
migrant labor. In the mid-19th century, immigrants were of
Spanish and Italian descent. By the end of the century,
Belgians, Poles, Germans and Portuguese additionally
immigrated to France.
^"^Alain de Benoist, "Pluralisme ou assimilation?," Elements ,
Avril 1993, 50.
^=^Ibid.
-^^Ronald Koven, "Muslim Immigrants and French Nationalists,"
op. cit . : 25
.
-^°"Le Grand Defi de 1 ' immigration en France," op. cit.: 25.
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Incidents of racism and violence began at the end of the
nineLeench cennury. Italians residing in the south v/ere the
ooiect of public humiliation and accused of eating bread
tnat belonged to the French.-'- Massacres of Italian
imir.igrants occurred in Marseille 1881, in Aigues-Mortes 1393
and in Lyon 1S94.--
Although the assimilation process was not without
conflic*: or violence, the similar ethnic makeup of
immigrants, coupled with a common Catholicism and European
cultivation v/ere contributing factors to successful
integration.
North Africans, Les Maghrebins (referring to Algerians,
Moroccans and Tunisians as a collective group) were not
initially considered part of the immigrant population since
they V. categorized as colonial workers between 1916-1918
and were excluded from the census.-^"
World Wars I and II had diametric responses to
immigration. VJorld War I generated an important need for
labor in France. While World War II sparked a rejection of
the foreigner and in particular of foreign labor. In
102.
"-L ' integration a la Francaise , op. cit.: 188.
-'^Dominique Schnapper, La France de 1 ' integration , op. cit.:
-'-Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, "North African Immigration and
the French Political Imaginary," op. cit.: 100.
193 5, immigration was officially halted and approxim.ately
20,000 foreign workers were repatriated, some forcibly.
The installation of the Vichy government m 1940 instituted
a policy of xenophobia and anti-Semitism. --'
At the end of World War II and the eradication of Vichy,
the French Republic officially ended discrimination cased on
race, origin and religion.-'^
During France's industrial expansion m the early _?'^0s
and a labor shortage, immigrants v;ere again gainfully sought
out and employed. Immigrants were employed in "burgeoning
industries like automotive manufacturing,"--'^ and perrormed
low paying functions which the common Frenchman and -woman
felt were beneath them (e.g., street sweeper)
.
Immigrants were regarded as hardworking and law-abiding
and interestingly enough, "they were not predisposed to
'chose France.'"^" Assimilation of the Maghrebin was
inhibited by the vastly different religions, language and
eating habits which served as social wedges preventing the
Frenchif ication of the Arab immigrant population.
"^L ' integration a la Francaise . op. cit.: 193.
^-^Ibid., 194.
^-^Ronald Kovan, "Muslim Immigrants and French Nationalists,"
op . cit . : 26
.
^"Roger Kaplan, "Through Kofi's Eyes," The Atlantic , Vol.
269, No. 4, April 1992, 38.
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The intricacies of French immigration were further
compiicated by the rationale that the Maghrebins v;ould be
senu back to their country of origin when io became
necessary, as well as by the Algerian VJar
.
In July of 1974, iirinigration was once again suspended.
VJith an estimated 3.5 million immigrants m France, ~he
policy v/as one of suspension of immigration and an attempt
to regulate clandestine immiigration . -'^
The advent of the 1980s brought "a dual movement towards
demarginalization and politicization . Immigration--'
particularly Algerian and Islamic --became an important pawn,
v/hilst immigrants themselves and their children began to
emerge from the shadows to sever the political links with
their country of origin. "^^^ The Maghrebin regarded France
as home. The 1990 census revealed that 3,607,590 immigrants
resided within French borders, of which 1,412,127 were from
the Maghreb.
"
. . .Migrants to France over that past one hundred years
have originated from several very distinct geo-spatial,
economic and political contexts. Hence, the descriptive
category of immigres is extremely heterogeneous. Political
"^L ' integration a la Francai se, op. cit.: 195.
^'^Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, "North African Immigration and
the French Political Imaginary," op. cit.: 100.
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interests seek to homogenize it, or rather its ideoiogical
homogenization is the outcome of political struggle ." ^'^°
B. MEASURES OF INTEGRATION
In 1991, uhe Haut Conseil a 1 ' Integrauion (High Council
for Integration) reaffirmed the Nationality Commission's
interpretation that immigrant groups and ethnic minorities
3'Ught to be integrated into society by way of a specifically
'French' model of integration.^"^
As previously discussed, the French model of integration
requires the total aosorption of an immigrant. Every anti-
French aspect of an immigrant is scrupulously altered to fit
into the French mold. As Miriam Feldblum points out:
The 'French' model implies an individualist,
assimilationist mode of integration into the
national political and cultural community. In
France, the classic integrationist institutions
for immigrants have been the ('republican') public
sector school system, the army, and the unions, and
not the intermediary organizations articulating
immigrant interests. Within this framework, the
inmigre in France is either marginalized under the
bias of state immigration policies, where the specific
differences of immigrants are externalized, or
assimilated and thus ethnically invisible or, at least,
silent. The 'ethnic citizen' does not, nor ought to
exist . '^'^^





The most common measure of integration includes nhe
aEnair-meni: of citizenship by decree or deciaranion. In 1991
alcne, "1,242 individuals acquired French citizenship.-'^
The ennnonazional group v;hich has the largest representanion
m obtaining French citizenship is the Maghreb community.
Coupled v:ith the attainment of French citizenship is a
prerequisite language requirement. Immigrants must
demonstrate an adequate comma::d of the French language.
Additionally, there is a process by which immigrants m^ay
either translate or modify their first or last name in order
to appear more 'French' and to loose any foreign
characteristics. In 1991, 10,356 individuals altered their
names . -^^
Little appears to have changed since the 18th century,
when peasants were forcibly indoctrinated in the French
culture and language and "recent trends in French
immigration and citizenship politics have reinforced the
dominant ideologies and assimilationist model. "^"^^
-^'Ministere des Affaires Sociales et de L ' integration. La
Politique de la Mationalite en 1991 , Octobre 1992, 4.
-^^Ibid., 55.
-'^Miriam Feldblum, "Paradoxes of ethnic politics: The case
of Franco-Maghrebis in France," op. cit.: 55.
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C. PARTICULARITIES AND BARRIERS
"The defense and insistence on a 'French' model of
integration. .. limits the articulation of ecnnic
af f irmations . " -^° More precisely, che French model has
consistently neglected to recognize certain cultural
particularities. Two controversial issues include, polygamy
and the Second Generation's repudiated recognition from
France and country of origin of their parents
.
Polygamy is regarded as unlawful under French law. Vet,
under the jurisdiction of countries sucn as Algeria ana
Morocco, polygamy is legal. The problem is further
compounded when an Algerian or Moroccan immigrant seeks zo
reunite his spouses and family under the French
reunification program. The family reunification program
entitles an immigrant and their family to reside on French
soil and benefit from financial subsidies during their stay.
In 1980, a landmark polygamy case in France, the
Montacho case, received a unfavorable ruling. The French
High court ruled that polygamy was contrary to public order.
Additionally, polygamic marriages were not considered part
of family reunification and would be regarded as an obstacle
'"Ibid., 58.
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for an immigrant attempting to acquire residential status m
France . -^"^
The second issue concerns the non-recognition of
::nildren engendered through mixed marriages. On the one
hand, they are the object of racial discrimination m
France. French citizenship requirem.ents , v;hich are vastly
changing m an attempt to dissuade attainment of
citizenship, only augment this frustration. Second, the
other country, from v/hich a foreign parent emigrated,
regards the child as strictly French and similarly rejects
them.
The French acculturation process of children from mixed
marriages makes virtually impossible the return to their
parents country of origin. An example focuses on young
Franco-Algerians who return to Algeria to perform their
obligatory military service. Algerian officers view them as
elements v;hich can not be assimilated since they are unable
to speak arable and they reflect French socialization.-'^^
Children of mixed marriages, in particular those with
French-Algerian backgrounds, suffer from an identity crisis.
They are caught between diametric cultures which essentially
-'^Haut Conseil a 1 ' integration, Conditions iuridiaues et
culturelles de 1 ' integration , Mars 1992, 30.
-^^Dominique Schnaoper, La France de 1 ' integration , od . cit
195.
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refuse acceptance. This is not an immigraLion problem, yet
a problem with society.
1. Islam
Islam poses a sizable barrier to French integration.
There are two predominant arguments pertaining to Islam and
its place in France. The first argument insists chat Islam
should be accepted along with its particularities as any
other worshipped faith. To single out Islam as a threat to
France and the French integration model indicates a massive
generalization regarding muslims and the faith they worsnip.
Proponents of Islam assert that their faith should be
permitted free and open practice. To deny such practice is
to legally restrict religious freedoms.
Islamic extremists and various acts of terrorism
have only served to render the French more anxious . This
point leads to the second argument which encompasses the
fear of Islam, which has been ignited by Islamic
fundamentalists. The images of Islam are ever present in
France; mosques, prayer rooms and cloaked women.
Compounding this fear is that Islam is the second most
practiced faith in France. It is a known fact that Islamic




A Tunisian immigrant and worshipper of Islam living
in France says this
:
I am in France to learn the interior of the vJestern
system that oppresses us and to learn tne science,
technique and tricks. Then, Z will be better armed
to fight them.-^"^
Regarding Magnrebins , he continued:
For ten years, v/e have been marred by Europe and the
imposition of laws, norms, an indigent life, a system
of empty thinking and atheism. Look arouna you at the
young Maghrebins . They are lost for Islam... they have
been skinned of their soul. It is that, the worst
violence that the West could inflict upon the children
CI _ s 1am
.
Another militant was quoted:
'•Je have not infiltrated Europe. Our assignments are to
infiltrate Europe and the vast Islamic community. It
suffices to look at the number of registered
conversions in Paris ... to know that as of this moment
Islam is awaken and nothing will stop it."^
The desire to spread the word of Islam by Islamic
militants represents an explosive dilemma. The potential
recruitment of disenchanted Maghrebins and Eeurs intensifies
an already precarious situation. Islam could provide a
cult-like atmosphere for identity-seeking youths. The
young, who search for an avenue of acceptance could find
-'^Philippe Aziz, "France-Europe: Le Plan Secret de




sanctuary under Islam and be lured to impose punishment:, via
terrorist actions, upon the French who have refused to
embrace them. Maghrebins and Beurs could serve as the
messianic messengers for Islam.
Islamic fundamentalists are not the only elements
provoking fear among the French. But, such cultural
indicators, as headscarves
, have stirred the Frencn.
In 1989, the foulard incident caused an uproar. "It revived
existing controversies, played on French fears of a
fundamentalist Islam, and dramatized anew continuing
concerns about the future of Muslim immigrant communities m
France . . . "^^^
The incident focused on three young girls who wore
headscarves to school and their head- teacher , who demanded
the headscarve be removed. Refusing the headteacher '
s
demand, the girls were expelled. The headscarf was viewed
essentially as a symbol of Islamic fundamentalism, as an
attack on secularity, and as a threat to the French model of
integration.^" Yet latter, the issue was widened to focus
on "...the place of Islam in France and the future of
-"Miriam Feldblum, "Paradoxes of ethnic politics: The case
of Franco-Maghrebis in France," op. cit.: 61.
--^Ibid., 63.
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TLillions of immigrants v/ho will never return to their
countries . "^^^
This drama illustrates contemporary French
sensitivity in zhe iSSOs toward Islam and the governmem: '
:
insistence to enforce the French model of integration.
Although the notion of pluralism reigns in the Mitterand
government, the right to cultural diversity is still an
awkward and threatenina conceot for manv French to acceDt
-^Ibid., 65.
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V. DIVERSITY VERSUS HOMOGENEITY;
THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT
Since the model of the nation in France has been
founded on uniformity and assimilation to a far
greater degree nhan the British or American model,
leaving no place for the recognition of minority
groups other than as nostalgic remnants of a
mythologized past, the claims of 'ethnic' difference
in France contain, perhaps a greater challenge co
the orinciples of exclusion nhan elsev/here . --'
The immigration policy was utilized as a devise to
fortify France economically. Immigrants were essentially
imported by the French, performed menial jobs regarded as
beneath the proud french and then were expected to depart
once their service was no longer desired. The
" frenchif ication" process was conducted while the immigrant
was employed on french soil. The French model of
integration essentially absorbed and assimilated all
foreigners. Immigrants were depleted of their "barbaric"
norms and mores and were ultimately transformed into
civilized, cultured Frenchmen and -women.
Contemporary France, confronted with a generation of
converted immigrants and their children, is reluctant to
accept their status as French. This generation and their
-'^Maxim Silverman, "Citizenship and the Nation-State in
France," op. cit.: 346.
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offspring desire equal status, acceptance and the right to
overtly practice their difference. The ensuing result has
oeen tnat Ttany French feel threatened by the emerging
unfatiiliar practices that are un-french and they demand
protection of the french nation, culture and people.
A prevailing theme suggests that immigrants are
reluctant to abandon former mores, while the archaic
integration formula remains unyielding and determined to
mold iminigrants into the French model. VJithin French
society, racism has surfaced as an enigma attempting ' to
ascribe blame for society's woes. "Foreigner equates to
guilt ... French equates to innocence ." '^^
Policies of cultural pluralism, initiated by Socialist
governments during the 1980 's, are a departure from the
traditional French emphasis on assimilation."^^''
The 1980 's saw the emergence of Beurs or Franco-
Maghrebis movement resulting in pressure forces in French
politic.-^. "The movement challenges the French model of
integration at several levels: as a form of identity
--"Marianne Amar et Pierre Milza, L ' immigration en France au
XXe Siecle , op. cit.: 84.
"^Tedd R- Gurr, Minorities at Risk (Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993): 152.
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politics, as a generator of political iritermediaries
, and as
a forum for ethnic lobbies. "^^^
As a means to promote immigrant rignts, organizations
such as SOS Racisme and France Plus '.vere establisned.
Referred to as moral front"', SOS Racisme is an organization
which is active in reducing the level of racial bigotry,
"encouraging nauuralizanion and registering people to -:oze
or bring forth anti-discrimination lawsuits ." ""'-^
Originally, SOS Racisme advocated a program wnich -.vas
extremist in nature. Subsequently, the organization ana its
creator, Harlem Desir, have altered their rhetoric and
trumpet the slogan Touche pas a mon pace (Hands off my
friend)
.
The slogan decries the lack of solace felt by many
young Maghrebins and Beurs
. "...The right to be different,
the right of a minority to foster its own language, its own
culture, its own methods, its own institutions..."^" SOS
Racisme continues to thrive, modifying its agenda to meet
"^Miriam Feldblum, "Paradoxes of ethnic politics: The case
of Franco-Maghrebis in France, op. cit.: 58.
--^Robert Kaplan, "Through Kofi's Eyes," op. cit.: 42.
-'°Ibid.
-"Collette Guillaumin, "'Race and Discourse," in Maxim
Silverman, ed.
,
Race, Discourse and Power in France (Brookf ield:
Gower Publishing Company, 1991): 12.
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current racial issues, and consists of 17,000 registered
Tiembers and 2 50 chapters nationwide.^"
Jrance-Pi'js, an integrative association, promotes
Magnrebins and Beurs to enroll on electoral lists and to
exercise their voting rights^''^ as well as the patronage of
candidates for local elections . ^""^ "France-Plus clearly uses
the tools of ethnic politics. Yet, it has not challenged
tne ideological bases of the French model that would render
ethnic politics incompatible with the French political
' es s . " "°"^
Organizations such as SOS Racisme and France-Plus are
not the only sources of pluralism. Indicators of cultural
pluralism were further evidenced in 1993 with the revival of
the ancient language of provencal . Some viewed the action
as a vital step away from exclusion. Yet, others have
professed that the revival of minority cultures, such as
provencal, will lead to new regionalism. ^^^
-^Ibid.
^"Maxim Silverman, "Citizenship and the Nation-State in
France," op. cit.: 347.
--^Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, "Immigration policy and the
issue of nationality," op. cit.: 331.
-"Miriam Feldblum, "Paradoxes of ethnic politics: The case
of Franco-Maghrebis in France," op. cit.: 60.
-'^Marlise Simons, "Provencal Leading a Revival of Europe's
Local Languages," The New York Times , 3 May 1993.
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The Socialist government's attempts to recognize
cultural diversity are significant, yet the facL of the
matter is that "cultural diversity and pluralism are nou
necessarily the guarantors of equality."*'"' Jrance does noL
cultivate immigrant cultures. Immigrants are free to
respect and practice their culture as long as it does not
interfere with the French public order. "^
In a speech President Mitterand recognized the ethno-
national diversity of France, when he stated
We are French. Our ancestors are the Gauls, and
7;e are also a little Roman, a little German, a
little Jewish, a little Italian, a small bit
Spanish, more and more Portuguese. VJho knows,
maybe Polish, too. And I wonder whether we
aren't a bit Arab.*"
Although the statement served as an acknowledgement of the
Arab community's presence in France's ancestry, the fact
that many French have difficulty accepting immigrants who
are legitimately French, by birth right or naturalization,
begs the question if nationalist impulses are approaching a
disastrous climax.
--'Maxim Silverman, "Citizenship and the Nation-state in
France," op. cit.: 346.




VI. CONCLUSION: THE DILEMMA'S FOR ATLANTICISM
All your strenguh is in your union,
All your danger is in discord.
Longfellow, Hiawauha
At "his r:oint, some reflection on broaaer securmy
implications is in order. The Atlantic oona kindled
democracy and stability for the European continent since the
194Gs. In the post Cold War confusion, new and old nations
search for new security structures and durable :lliances.
In this context, the spread of integral nationalism
throughout Europe threatens the durability of Atlanticism.
Nationalism portends not only instability, but anarchy for
Europe. Congenial alliances turn into warring factions and
the once common Atlantic values become singular values.
Atlanticism, a viable security policy, needs to be
safeguarded by the United States in the wake of reemerging
nationalist surges.
The North Atlantic Treaty, signed on 4 April 1949,
marked the institutionalization of Atlanticism in the post
v/ar v;orld, the bond between the United States and Europe, of





The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith
in the purposes and principles of the Charter
of the United Nations and their desire to live
in peace with all peoples and all governments.
They are determined to safeguard the freedom,
common heritage and civilization of their peoples,
founded on the principles of democracy, individual
liberty and the rule of law.
They seek to promote stability and -.veil-being m
the North Atlantic area.
They are resolved to unite their efforts for
collective defense and for the preservation of peace
and security. '
°
The treaty signified a declaration of shared democratic
values and a pledge from the parties to maintain peace and
security within the Atlantic region. Most important, the
spirit of the treaty was to "live in peace v;ith all peoples
and their governments" and to safeguard freedom, common
heritage and civilization of their peoples, based on the
principles of democracy and individual liberty.
Over 40 years after the ratification of the North
Atlantic treaty, certain observers remark that the treaty
has lost its spirit. The environment of peace for "all"
peoples and their governments has not been preserved.
Additionally, the freedoms, heritage and civilizations of
the peoples have been neglected. Since 1989, multi-
nationalism and revived nationalism have come to the
^^°Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States: The
Enduring Alliance (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1988): 219.
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forefront of European security issues. The evidence lies m
the collapse and ruin of the former Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia
.
Although the Atlantic partners maintain a bond and
possess common democratic values, there exists much actual
discord. A nationalist epidemic is sweeping Europe, evident
in ethnic cleansing and anti-immigration politics. Mo
nation-state is impervious to the havoc of nationalism and
the plague of integral nationalism on the old, new pattern
is making its way to the Atlantic.
France's past nationalistic episodes, coupled with a
current wave of anti-immigrant, anti-American sentiments are
relevant to the future of French and Atlantic security and
of importance to the United States. First, the French
increasingly regard the foreign presence, whether immigrant
or American, as a detriment to the French nation-state and
identity. Contemporary examples of dissension exists within
the framework of GATT and disputes regarding agriculture and
film making subsidies . ^^-^
Thus, one should ask whether immigration builds or
destroys a nation? Throughout their history, the French
have consistently sought to protect their identity from
internal and external threats. Most American's reaard this
^^^Roger Cohen, "U.S. -French Cultural Trade Rift Now Snags a
World Agreement," The Mew York Times , 8 December 1993.
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I
concern as an oddity. Additionally, can the United States
maintain an alliance with a nation that embraces a radical
different ideal of the nation and citizenship?
Second, since 1945 the Franco-American relationship has
consistently been surrounded with friction. "The French
pointedly show their dissension with the united States at
every opportunity. 'It is almost a Frencn reflex to oppose
what the United States wants, without feeling it necessary
to propose anything different or better. . . ' '"'"
The Frencn government has disagreed with the United
States and rejected most efforts to foster Ajnerican
influence in Europe. NATO has been the site for Frencn and
American feuds since the 1940s. The feuds of today revolve
around issues of the threatened French identity, Euro-Disney
and GATT. Anti-foreigner sentiments in France are the
result of nationalism and the spread of nationalism
throughout the European community has served to weaken the
Atlantic bond.
Essentially, the Franco-American relationship remains
one in which each nation has simply recognized the national
particularities of the other. Generally, Americans regard
the French as pretentious and arrogant, while the French
view Americans as uncultured "Yankees." France is a nation
-'^Luigi Barzini, The Europeans , op. cit.: 134
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"... "hat v/ants to be recognized as iihe dominating power in
Europe but refuses to acknowledge the fact that nation-
snares, even one as glorious and prosperous as France, have
snrunk to mediocre dimensions, impotent when alone, no m.atch
for the superpowers . "^^^
Ironically enough, "he current French immigration
dilemma m.irrors chat of the United States. The influx of
immigrants from Mexico has caused the United States to
review imimigration policies and controls. Mexicans are
regarded as the foreigner, are responsible for debilitating
"he economy and m.any American's desire austere regulations.
'•Jith the end of the Cold war, observers suggest that the
era of Atlanticism has reached its end and that the twenty-
first century marks the age of the Pacific.'^* The end of
the cold war and the demise of the Soviet Union were
contributing factors which lead to a search for a new
nemesis and the diminishing importance of Atlanticism.
By and large. Atlanticism has not reached an end,
instead the United States has placed the rapport on the back
burner to be monitored, so that it does not spill over.
-'^Ibid., 154.
-"^Timothy Egan, "Pacific Chiefs to Meet Where 2 Worlds Mix,"
The Mew York Times , 15 November 1993.
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A. AN ENIGMATIC FRENCH FUTURE
France is the most brilliant and dangercus nation
in Europe, best suited to become in turn an oD]ect
of admiration, hatred, pity, "error, hut never
of indifference.
Alexis de Tocqueville"^
"Intense struggles have developed in Europe m tne _27 0s
and the 1980s to recapture a lost sense cf national
identity. More often than not, these struggles are tinged
with racist discourse."''^ The epicenter :f a nation's
identity crisis is found v;ithin the confines of party
politics, the yjdicial arena and from within society
proper . ^''''
In contemporary France, the Front National is a
harbinger of future integral nationalist politics. Fueled
by high unemployment and rampant immigration, this
xenophobic movement prospers and sets an example for the
rest of Europe; Great Britain, Belgium, Germany. Yet, the
French identity crisis coupled with intense nationalist
surges is not a new phenomena nor strictly restricted to the
French.
-^Ibid.
-^^James F. Hollifield, Immigrants, Markets, and States
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992): 171.
^''Ibid.
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since 1789, che process of nationalism suggests why
Jrench identity is sacred and prized. Throughout French
hisuory, philosophers, academics, politicians and nhe
population have be_ieved that "heir identity v/as threatened.
The ioreign threat, v/hether through invasion, immigration or
mixed blood, oecame and is a paranoia specific to the
Trench
.
""he Frencn nation-state, instinctively throughout its
evolution, sought a homogenous French identity. The threat
v;as not solely from the foreign exterior, but was internal
as v.'ell. France, according to Luigi Barzini, was
. . .molded down the centuries by antagonisms and tensions
between tribes, clans, cliques, classes, loteries,
guilds, camarillas, sects, parties, factions within the
parties; regions - Occitanie, Brittany, and now Corsica-
against the centralized state; the Midi against the
North; the provinces against Paris, and in Paris, the
Right Bank against the Left Bank, the center against^^Ia
banlieue, the poor against the Two Hundred Families. -^^
French national identity is ultimately the creation of
-he 19 th century Paris bourgeoisie, and elite who brought
Franc together culturally, linguistically and spiritually.
French peasants were striped of their regional influences
and inculcated with a the urban culture of Paris.
-^Ibid., 138.
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In order to be recognized as a legitimate French
citizen, one must speak French, "act French, " simply be
French in all dimensions. The mandatory ::ransformanion
commenced in the 19th century with the peasant who was
molded into a Frenchmen and later with the advent of
immigration, the immigrant was converted in turn.
The external foreign threat, explored throughout this
thesis, took on numerous forms from the Jew to the immigrant
and the subsequent nationalistic outbursts blemished the
French past. The contemporary foreigner in France is the
Arab immigrant. Yet, mixed into the category of immigrants
are legitimate French citizens, those engendered through
mixed marriages or born on French soil. Many French, who
have an immigrant ancestry themselves, dismiss this
generation and regard them as foreign.
Open intolerance has not always been the guiding policy.
France for generations "...received the political outcasts
of repressive Continental regimes, and Paris .. .was ... for
emigres a political Mecca where their revolutionary faith
could be kept alight. "^^^ The same can not be said in 1993.
The once wide open doors have now been sealed shut.
^^^Michael R. Marrus, The Unwanted (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1985): 145.
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As u. Barou states:
There is therefore a paradox in the policies of the
French state v/ith regard to minority groups, v/ho are
both invited to merge into the national fabric .y
renouncing their attachment to origins, yet v/ho are
also the object of particularist designations v;ith
v/nich they are suDsequently reproacned. "'
France, in addition to other European nations, is
confronted v;ith a serious immigration dilemma which requiras
a viable solution. Europe of the 21st century faces nev;
risks: "ethnic, fundamental, nationalist conflicts, unequal
distribution of v/ealth and migration requiring new policies
and nev; forms of co-operation."'^^
A major problem in Europe is the urban concentration of
immigrants which sparks the resentment of the native
population. . .-^^ " . . .The presence of foreigners draws out
nationalist passions and racial hatred."^" French
nationalists regard immigrants as responsible for high
unemployment, overburdened government services and increased
crime and drug trazficking. Although the vast majority of
^-^Maxim Silverman, Deconstructing the Nation (London:
Routledge, 1992) : 103.
^^^Alasdair Stewart, "Migrants, Minorities and Security in
Europe, " in Conflict Studies 252 (London: The Research Institute
for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, June 1992): 23.
-^^Ibid., 24.
-"James F. Hollifield, Immigrants, Markets and States , op.
cit . : preface
.
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immigrants perform jobs which are regarded as beneath the
native population or too low paying, they are the
predominate target for what ails a nation.
In 1993, Zurope v;as to become a union. Instead, "each
nation state wants to resist its change into a multicultural
frontier-free "melting-pot" community ." '''* Events inspirea
in the name of nationalism serve as grim remainders of it's
fury. These current examples of rampant nationalism have
provided democracies will a harsh reality check.
Tony Judt articulates with precision the French dilemma:
History has made the choice on France's behalf - it
simply is a multicultural society, and the real
choice it faces is this: either to find a way to
understand this domestic variety as French and to
incorporate it as such into the nation; or else
morbidly to await the foreseeable outcome of its
failure to do so.-"^
He additionally asserts that
If they cannot find some way to adapt republican
values to the needs of different sorts of residents,
people who fit none of the old categories and are
none the less citizens of France, the French miay
discover that they have overcome their centuries-
long exceptionalism and brought together the two
strands of their bifurcated "roman national," only
to slip with no more grace than their less fortunate
neighbours into a common European nightmare . ^°^
-"^Alasdair Stewart, "Migrants, Minorities and Security in
Europe," op. cit.: 25.
-^^Tony Judt, "Chauvin and his heirs," TLS, 9 July 1993, 12
"°Ibid.
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The current v/ave of French nationalism serves to remind
us chat no nation is devoid of nationalist "endencies. yet
some nations are more apt than others no fall prey "o it.
Muliiculturalism is not the absolute solution to nhe curreni:
French polemic. A resolution is only apparent from v/ithin.
Firs", the French pasE illustrates a nationalist trend from
1789 to the present. The French must counter impulses "hat
'/ould repeat history. Second, uhe new ethnically mixed
..eration of French citizens, represented in the second
ge-" '--ration and Beurs , must gain political and popular
strength. Until that time, they will not be regarded as
French, but as the enemy from within, essentially an
adversary. Jacob Burckhardt ' s commentary applies:
The extermination of the adversary then appears to the
demented eye the only salvation. Nor shall sons and




"Jacob Burckhardt, Reflections on History , Dp. cit.: 236
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